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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an anonymous protocol to
secure nodes which have important roles in the network. We focus
in the clustering approach to secure the Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
(MANETs). In each cluster, a confident node is selected to
ensure the Certification Authority (CA) roles; however, the cluster
security depends in the security of the CA node. Therefore, we
present an Anonymous Dynamic Demilitarized Zone (ADDMZ)
to protect the CA node identity and to avoid the single point of
failure in the cluster. ADDMZ is formed by a set of confident
nodes which have a high trust level between them and their goal is
to filter the communication between the cluster member node and
the CA node. Moreover, we draw one’s inspiration from military
defence mechanisms such as: camouflage and identity change
mechanisms. We present protocol to realize these mechanisms by
using the identity based cryptographic from bilinear maps. The
security analysis is proposed to discuss the proposed protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, researcher’s attention is turning towards the
security in Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANETs) mainly due to
their characteristics and their application fields. In MANETs,
the privacy issue becomes more crucial and important for
mobile nodes because of MANETs’ characteristics particularly
the open network in which the radio is shared by all nodes.
The node’s identity is exposed to the channel eavesdropping.
Without trying to secure the identity of the nodes which have
an important role in the network like security services, the
vulnerability can be exploited by attackers to create the Denial
of Services (DoS) attacks. The security in MANETs consists
to ensure the authentication, authorization, confidentiality, data
integrity and dynamic trust model evolution. Many solutions
were proposed in literature to secure MANETs, however, few
of them take into account the real MANETs’ characteristics
such as: mobility, open network, energy limitation, etc.
In our previous works, we proposed a new architecture
based on a trust model and a secure clustering algorithm in
order to create a dynamic key management system adapted to
MANETs’ characteristics [5]. The main idea consist in dis-
tributing the Certification Authority (CA) in each cluster and
ensuring the security of these CA nodes by a new mechanism
called DDMZ (Dynamic Demilitarized Zone). However, the
identity of the CA node and the set of nodes which form
the DDMZ are not protected. That means that any unknown
node (not confident) can eavesdrops the communication and
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find the identity of these important nodes. This information
can be useful for the attacker to plan attacks against the CA
node in order to disturb the cluster operation. Therefore, if the
CA node is compromised, that means that the security of the
cluster is calling into question.
In this paper, we focus on the secure distributed architecture
to ensure the security and we introduce another security’s
parameter, called anonymity. The goal is to ensure the sensitive
security services such as: CA and Registration Authority (RA)
nodes without disclosing the nodes’ identity. We use the
simple designed verifier signature (SDVS) [1] to generate the
dynamic pair-keys and we use the pseudonym for a confident
identity instead of their real identity in order to mask the
real identity and to protect them against potential attacks. We
improve the DDMZ concept by introducing the anonymity
concept to design the Anonymous Dynamic Demilitarized
Zone (ADDMZ). The idea consists in making the CA identity
node hidden for unknown nodes and the nodes with a low trust
level. To reach this goal, the identity change and camouflage
mechanisms are presented. Furthermore, we propose a new
protocol to establish the ADDMZ and the communication
intra and extra ADDMZ. Moreover, the secure protocol of the
communication between clusters is investigated and presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The section
II is devoted to the summarization of the distributed architec-
ture and the DDMZ concept. Furthermore, we present some
existing works with the anonymity concept. Moreover, we
summarize the simple designed verifier signature (SDVS). In
section III, we present the proposed protocols named ICCP
which is based on identity change and camouflage mecha-
nisms. In section IV, we investigate the security analysis of
the ICCP and we present its performance. Finally, the section
V concludes the paper with future works.
II. RELATED WORKS
In our previous work, we proposed a distributed hierarchical
architecture which divided the network into clusters to secure
the network [5]. In this architecture, we have defined a
trust model to assign different roles such as the certification
authority (CA) and the registration authority (RA) roles in
each cluster. We also proposed the secure distributed clustering
algorithm (SDCA) to divide the network into a certain number
of clusters. Furthermore, we introduced the new concept of
Dynamic Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) to secure the CA node
in each cluster. A DDMZ is an intermediate zone between
unknown nodes and the CA node in each cluster. It is formed
by a set of confident nodes, where at least one has the RA role.
The RA role consists in filtering the communication between
the CA and other nodes in order to protect the CA node against
any potential attack. However, this architecture does not ensure
the anonymous communication between the confident nodes.
There are several approaches of anonymous communication:
Zhang et al. [3] proposed the anonymous communication
protocol called MASK. In MASK protocol, the authors assume
that the system’s administrator generates a large set of pseudo
identities (IDs) for each node. However, each node has a
certain pseudo ID set. The set’s size should be large enough
in order to avoid the vulnerability to find the pseudonym
by attackers. The real problem is that the pseudo IDs work
like real identities and that the attackers are able to identify
each node. In addition, the pseudo identity maintenance and
management are costly. Rahman et al., [4] proposed RIOMO
protocol to improve the MASK weakness by reducing pseudo
IDs’ maintenance costs which nodes take only one pseudo ID
from system’s administrator and generate their own pseudo IDs
for an anonymous communication. Another work dealing with
anonymity and privacy proposed a secure dynamic distributed
in [6] which is based on ”the onion routing protocol” [7].
This protocol ensures the route anonymity but not a strong
location privacy. Kong et al. [2] proposed an Anonymous On-
Demand Routing (ANODR) based on topology and broadcast
to improve the receiver’s anonymity. ANODR is an on-demand
protocol based on trapdoor information in the broadcast. Trap-
door information is a security concept that has been widely
used in encryption and authentication schemes.
TABLE I
TABLE OF VARIABLES AND NOTATION
IDi Real identity of the node i
IDPi Pseudonyme of the node’s identity
< K+i , K
−
i > Public and Private Keys of the node i
< rK
+
j , rK
−
j > Real public and Private Keys of the node j
SK
j
i Session key shared between nodes i and j
Kig Key of the group i
EaK(M) Cryptogram of M encrypted by public cryptography
algorithm (RSA, ElGamal) and using a key K
SIN
K
−
i
(M) Signature of the message M generated by the node i
EsK(M) Cryptogram of M encrypted by symmetric cryptog-
raphy algorithm (AES, 3DES) and using a key K
III. ICCP: IDENTITY CHANGE AND CAMOUFLAGE
PROTOCOLS
A. Preliminary
The military defence mechanisms such as: camouflage and
identity change mechanisms are inspired by the animals’
defence mechanisms. Many animals use the camouflage mech-
anism to avoid the predator’s attacks, we can quote as example
the iguana’s camouflage when it is perched in trees. The
chameleon is an example of the identity change. Therefore,
for our solution we adopt the identity change mechanism for
confident nodes and the camouflage mechanism for the CA
and RA nodes in order to secure the DDMZ. Hence, the goal
is to mask the identity of all confident nodes particularly
the CA and RA nodes and protect their activities against
eavesdropping and traffic analysis attacks.
We consider that each confident node has both a real identity
and a pseudonym, and it also has two pairs of keys: real keys
(private/public) and dynamic pair-keys generated according to
the SDVS scheme [1] for each a cluster’s configuration or
formation. The set of the notations used in the paper are listed
in table I.
B. Identity change of confident nodes
In order to realize a confident chameleon node with identity
masking, we used the bilinear maps and the mechanism
developed in [4]. We suppose that each confident node has
secret point SPi which depends on the real identity of the
confident node. However, SPi is generated as follows: first,
the system determines two groups G1 (additive group) and G2
(multiplicative group) of the same prime order q. Secondly,
it determines a bilinear map f : G1 × G1 → G2 and
two collision resistant cryptographic hash functions H1 and
H2 defined as follows: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓ where ℓ-bit fixed length output. Thirdly, it
generates the secret Sc ∈ Zq of confident community nodes,
but neither the confident nodes nor other nodes know the
secret Sc. The confident nodes securely receive their secret
point before the nodes’ deployment. In addition, the system
parameters {G1,G2, f,H1,H2} are known to the confident
nodes. Therefore, each confident node has a secret point
SPi = Sc.H1(IDi) where IDi is its real identity. When a
confident node (IDi) wants to change its identity for any
security reason, it generates a new pseudo identity called IDPi
and its pseudo secret point (SPPi) as follows:{
IDPi = ri.H1(IDi)
SPPi = ri.SPi = ri.Sc.H1(IDi) = Sc.IDPi
where ri is a random number generated by node IDi.
Fig. 1. Anonymous confident nodes authentication
When two nodes A and B want to check if each other
is confident node, the process is shown in figure 1. Let’s
suppose that the new pseudo identity of nodes A and B with
their associate secret point are called as: {IDPA, SPPA} and
{IDPB , SPPB}. Node A sends its new identity with the
random value:〈IDPA, rA,K+PA, s〉 to node B, where s =
H2(K
+
PA||SK
PB
PA ) and SKPBPA = (K
+
PB)
K
−
P A
. Once node
B has received this information and after deciphering by its
private key, it calculates the session key SKPBPA = (K
+
PA)
K
−
P B
for the next encryption packet and it checks the integrity of
PA’s public key and the session key by using the parameter
”s”. If the checking procedure is going well, it computes
a key KBA according to the bilinear properties, KBA =
f(SPPB , IDPA) = f(IDPB , IDPA)
Sc and it generates the
random rB , and then it generates V erB = H2(KBA||rA||rB).
Then, a node B sends this information 〈IDPA, rB , V erB〉
to node A encrypted by the session key. When node A
receives this information and after deciphering by the session
key, it computes the key KAB like node B did it: KAB =
f(SPA, IDPB) = f(IDPA, IDPB)
Sc = KBA, then node A
computes V er′B = H2(KAB ||rA||rB). If V erB == V er′B
then it calculates V erA = H2(KAB ||rA||rB ||IDPA||IDPB)
and it sends encrypted information 〈IDPA, V erA〉 by the
session key to node B. Once node B has received this
information and deciphering operation going well, computes it
the V er′A = H2(KAB ||rA||rB ||IDPA||IDPB) and compare
it with V erA if it matches, then node B deduces that node A
is a confident node.
According to the trust model developed in [5], each node has
a trust metric (Tm) which defines the node’s trust level. Only
a confident node can have the highest trust level (Tm = 1).
However, when the unknown node IDk (which does not
belong to a set of confident nodes) joins the cluster, the
cluster’s CA gives it a low trust level and increases it when
the monitoring process gives its positive evaluation. Once IDk
has reached the conditions to become confident, we need to
answer to this question: how a new confident node obtain its
secret point SP ? In our model, only the CA node can generate
the confident status by changing the identity of the unknown
node changes from IDk to IDPk = H1(IDk).IDPi where
CAi = IDPi is the CA node’s pseudo identity. Moreover,
the CA node generates the secret point SPIDP k to IDPk as
follows:
SPIDP k = ri.SPIDi .H1(IDk)
= ri.Sc.H1(IDi).H1(IDk) = Sc.IDPi.H1(IDk)
= Sc.IDPk
Once a node IDk has received its new pseudonym identity
IDPk and its corresponding Secure Point SPIDP k , it can
authenticate and be authenticated by any confident node.
C. Security of CA and RA nodes in ADDMZ
In order to secure the CA and RA nodes, we adopt the
camouflage mechanism. Once the CA node is elected, it
changes its identity by generating the new pseudonym identity
named (CAi = IDPi) according to the identity change
mechanism illustrated above. CAi = ri.H1(IDi), where ri
is a random variable generated by IDi. Moreover, CAi uses
the SDVS scheme [1] to generate dynamically the cluster’s
(i) private and public keys at each cluster’s formation and
configuration. Then, CAi establishes the secret session key
(SKRAjCAi ) with each RAj node according to the SDVS scheme.
The CAi node establishes the session key as follows:
• It computes K−CAi = xi.H1(CAi) where xi is a random
number in Zp and then, it computes the public key of the
cluster i (K+CAi) and the value ”s” to ensure the integrity
of K+CA and SK
RAj
CAi
as follows: K+CAi = g
K
−
CAi and
s = H2(K
+
CA||SK
RAj
CAi
) where SKRAjCAi = (K
+
RAj
)
K
−
CAi .
• It forms the message M = [#Idp||CAi||RAj ||K+CAi ||s],
where #Idp is a unique identifier for each packet in
the entire network which is randomly selected. Then, it
encrypts the message M by the public key of the RAj
node as follows: C = EaK+
RAj
(M).
• The CAi sends the packet P (P=〈C〉) to RAj .
Once the node at one hop from the CAi has received the
packet P, it tries to decrypt the cryptogram ”C” by using its
private key K−Nj , if the deciphering operation is successful,
then the receiver node deduces that it is the destination and
it checks the integrity of the packet P, otherwise it is not the
destination and it drops the packet.
The CAi node repeats the same operation with each RA
node, and then, it shares the session key (SKRAjCAi ) with all
RA nodes (RAj). Furthermore, the CAi uses the shared
session key with the RA nodes to generate the group key
(Kig) of the ADDMZ. Therefore, if the size of the ADDMZ
is k, then Kig is generated as follows:
Kig = H2(SK
RA1
CAi
||SKRA2CAi ||...||SK
RAk
CAi
)
The set of RA nodes which form the DDMZ of the cluster
i takes the pseudonym ”DDMZi”. We use the same principle
of broadcast used by ANODR [2] to secure CA and RA nodes’
receiver anonymity. For instance, each packet transmitted to
the CAi or any RA node in the cluster (i), the destination
address should be quoted as DDMZi. No node, even located
at one hop from the DDMZi is able to identify the RA node’s
pseudonyme and to know the real identity of the RA nodes
which form the DDMZ. Therefore, in order to secure the RA
nodes identity, the public and the private keys (K−ddmz,K+ddmz)
of the Anonymous DDMZ need to be generated. These keys
are based on the secret shared group key Kig between a set
of RA and CAi nodes. The private key of the ADDMZ is
known only by RA and CA nodes and is calculated as follows:
K−ddmz = H1(K
i
g). However, the public key of the ADDMZ
is calculated as follows: K+ddmz = gK
−
ddmz
.
D. Intra-cluster communication
In the intra-cluster communication, we distinguish two types
of communications: intra-ADDMZ communication and extra-
ADDMZ communication.
1) intra-ADDMZ communication: The communication
intra-ADDMZ does not exceed one hop from the CA. Only
the CA and RA nodes are able to decrypt the information in a
packet broadcast in this zone. However, the CA can privately
communicate with each RA node.
The communication between the CA and RA nodes is
encrypted by the Kig in the case of the broadcast packet
for ADDMZ. However, in the case of the private commu-
nication between the CAi and RAj , the both shared ses-
sion keys (SKRAjCAi ) and the group key Kig are used. Once,
RAj wants to privately send the message m to the CAi
node, it forms the packet as follows: P = 〈Q〉, where
Q = EsKig (#Idp, CAi, RAj , C) and C is the cryptogram
encrypted by the session key SKRAjCAi (Q = EsSKRAj
CAi
(m)).
Only RA and CA nodes are able to deciphering the packet by
using the group key and checking the destination and source
address which can be RA or CA nodes.
2) Extra-ADDMZ communication: In order to mask the
identity of RA nodes which generate the pair of keys
(K−ddmz,K+ddmz) based on the group key Kig . The public
key of the ADDMZ (K+ddmz) and the public key of the
CA role (K+CAi) are broadcast by the CAi node in the
HELLO cluster beacon via RA nodes to all the nodes in
the cluster (i). The HELLO cluster beacon is periodically
generated by the CA node in order to maintain the cluster and
to distribute the cluster’s identity information which comes
down to the ADDMZ public key and to the public key of the
CA role. The hello cluster packet named PHello is formed as
follows: PHello = [#Idp, hop,DDMZi,K+CAi ,K
+
ddmz, S],
where the hop = hopmax − 1 which is the cluster’s size and
S = SINK−
CA
(#Idp||K
+
CAi
||K+ddmz) .
In order to realize the camouflage of the pseudo identity
of the CA and of RA nodes and according to the previous
section, we use the anonymous broadcast address. In the case
of IEEE 802.11, a predefined multicast address can be used
as source or destination MAC address [2].
When node Ni receives PHello, it checks if (hop− 1 ≥ 0)
then it continues the checking operation ; otherwise it drops
the packet. Then, it checks the packet identifier (#Idp), in
other words, it checks if the packet has already been received
or not. If the packet has not been received it continues to
check the integrity and the authentication of PHello by using
the public key of the CA role ; otherwise the packet is rejected.
In the case of the whole checking procedure is going well and
the receiver node has its certificate from the CAi, it forwards
the packet to its neighbours after the hop parameter has been
updated. Moreover, it adds its certificate in the packet and it
saves the #Idp and the reception time of the packet Trecv .
The #Idp, DDMZi and Trecv are important to route the
packet to the ADDMZi and to form the routing table based
on the virtual circuit identifier (VCI) concept [2]. This concept
permits to route the packet according to the virtual identity.
The format of the forwarded packet by the node Ni is as
follows: 〈#Idp, hop− 1, Ni, CertCAi(Ni),K+CAi ,K
+
ddmz, S〉
where the certificate format is defined as follows:
CertCAi(Ni) = SINK−
CAi
[Ni||status||K
+
Ni
||validtime]
The status parameter determines the security level attributed
to the node Ni, if Ni is unknown, the CAi allocates the
visitor’s status with a low trust level for Ni node. In addition,
the ”validtime” parameter determines the valid time duration
of the certificate. The forwarding operation is repeated as
described above until the border nodes are reached which
means hop− 1 ≤ 0.
3) Certification request: If Ni wants to join the cluster (i),
it requests the CAi by sending the certification request packet,
as follows:
Ni → DDMZi : 〈#Idp, Cert req, hop,DDMZi, Ni, S〉
where, S = SINK−
ddmz
(Ni||K
+
Ni
). All certification request
should passed via the DDMZi (RA nodes), before arrived to
the CAi. The member nodes of the cluster do not accept to
forward the packet of the nodes which do not have the valid
certificate except the certification request.
E. Inter-clusters communication
The inter-clusters communication is ensured by the border
nodes. For security reasons, not all border nodes can ensure
the link between two clusters but they need to have a high
trust level to get the getaway status GW, for more details the
reader can refer to the trust model in [5]. The communication
between GW nodes and ADDMZ (Anonymous DDMZ) must
be encrypted. When the border node Nx with a high trust level
receives from clusters i and j the cluster beacon HELLO packet
PHello, it will securely request the ADDMZ for each cluster
to obtain the GW certificate. The GW certification is generated
by CAi and CAj nodes after a mutual checking procedure,
to be that CAi and CAj are confident nodes. The Nx forms
the packet to request the gateway certificate as follows:
Nx → DDMZi :
〈#Idp, hop,DDMZi, Nx, CertCAi(Nx), U, S〉
where,{
U = EaK+
ddmzi
(Nx||CertCAj (Nx)||CAj ||K
+
CAj
||K+ddmzj )
S = SINK−
Nx
(#Idp||DDMZi||CertCAi(Nx)||U)
Once the ADDMZi receives the gateway certification request,
it first checks the validity of CertCAi(Nx), then it checks the
integrity and the validity of CertCAj (Nx), then the trust level
of the node Nx. If the checking procedure is going well, the
ADDMZi forwards the packet to the CAi. The CAi needs to
check that the real identity of the CAj belongs to the confident
community. Hence, the anonymous inter-cluster authentication
is needful.
Anonymous inter-clusters authentication: Once the CAi
wants to check if the CAj role is ensured by the confident
node and create the virtual private network between both
clusters i and j. The CAi generates the packet to the CAj
with the random ”ri = challenge” used to generate the CAi
(CAi = ri.H1(IDi)) and its pseudonym CAi. Then, it sends
to RAy the packet which is formed as follows:
CAi → RAy : 〈Eskig (#Idp||RAy||CAi||Q1)〉
where Q1 is defined as follows:

Q1 = EsSKRAy
CAi
(#Idp, hop,Nx, U1)
U1 = EaK+
CAj
[K+CAi ||ri||S]
S = SINK−
CAi
(#Idp||Nx||K
+
CAi
||CAi||ri)
Once the ADDMZi has received the packet, only RAy takes
on the certification request of node Nx forwards the packet to
its neighbours.
DDMZi(Ry) → Nx :
〈#Idp, hop,Nx, CertCAi(DDMZi), U1, S〉
where, S = SINK−
ddmzi
(#Idp||Nx||CertCAi(DDMZi)||U1)
When the Nx receives the packet from ADDMZi and after
the integrity and authentication checking procedure has been
carried out by using the parameter S, it uses its certification
CertCAj (Nx) to communicate with the cluster j and it sends
the following packet:
Nx → DDMZj :
〈#Idp, hop,DDMZj , CertCAj (Nx), U1, S〉
where, S = SINK−
Nx
(#Idp||DDMZj ||CertCAj (Nx)||U1)
and U1 is the same block receiver as the one from the
DDMZi.
Once, the DDMZj has received the packet from Nx
and after checking the hop, CertCAj (Nx) and integrity with
authentication of the packet the DDMZj forwards the packets
to the CAj as follows:
DDMZj(RAx) → CAj : 〈EsKjg (#Idp||CAj ||RAx||Q2)〉
where, Q2 = EsSKRAk
CAj
(#Idp, hop,Nx, U1) and RAx is the
member of the DDMZj .
After deciphering and checking the #Idp and hop parameters,
the CAj node decrypts the U1 block with its private key and
checks the integrity of Nx and K+CAi parameters. If the whole
verification procedure is going well the CAj computes the key
Ki,j and the V erj parameters as follows:{
Ki,j = f(SPj , CAi) = f(CAj , CAi)
Sc
V erj = H2(Ki,j ||ri||rj)
where, the SPj is the secret point of the node CAj and the
rj is the random challenge generated by node CAj in order
to generate its pseudonym CAj = rj .H1(IDj). Then, CAj
node sends the parameters rj and V erj to node CAi by the
same way as described above.
Once the CAi has received the packet, the CAi will use the
session shared key with RAy to decipher the packet and after
checking the parameters S of the packet’s signature by using
the public key of the CAj in order to be sure that a packet
is generated by the CAj . Moreover, the CAi uses its private
key K−CAi to decipher the parameter U2 (cf figure 2). If the
deciphering operation is successful then it computes the Ki,j
and checks the V erj parameter.{
Ki,j = f(SPi, CAj) = f(CAi, CAj)
Sc
V er′j = H2(Ki,j ||ri||rj)
If V er′j equals to V erj then the CAi deduces that CAj is a
confident node. Then, CAi generates V eri so that CAj checks
if the CAi is a confident node.
V eri = H2(Ki,j ||ri||rj ||CAi||CAj)
Using the same process, node CAi sends V eri to CAj .
Once the CAj has received the parameters and after the
checking procedure has been carried out, CAj computes
V er′i (V er′i = H2(Kj,i||ri||rj ||CAi||CAj)) and checks if
V er′i == V erj then CAj are now sure that CAi node is
a confident node. Therefore, the gateway certification of Nx
node is generated by both nodes CAi and CAj . Figure 2
Fig. 2. Anonymous CA nodes authentication
illustrates the anonymous CA nodes authentication protocol.
With this protocol any CA node can anonymously authenticate
other CA nodes in adjacent clusters.
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Security analysis
Identity privacy of confident nodes: with ICCP the con-
fident nodes’ identities are protected by using the pseudonym
or pseudo identity, so that no node is able to guess the real
identity of the confident nodes from the pseudonyms. The
pseudo identity mechanism permits to dynamically change the
pseudo identity of confident nodes such as: CA and RA nodes
for each cluster’s formation or new cluster’s configuration.
Security of security services: in order to secure the CA
and the RA nodes in each cluster, we did not limit only
on the protection of the confident nodes’ identity but we
proposed another mechanism to protect the sensitive roles
of confident nodes which belong to the DDMZ. We named
this mechanism the camouflage mechanism. This mechanism
ensures the privacy of the pseudo identity of nodes which
belong to the DDMZ group by using the broadcast address
allocated to this group.
Group key of DDMZ: the DDMZ’s group key is the result
of one way hash function of the session keys (SK) set shared
between the CA and RA nodes. The RA nodes based on the
DDMZ’s group key (Kg) to constitute the DDMZ pair keys
private and public ({K−ddmz,K+ddmz}). Whenever the group
of RA nodes changes because one or more RA node joins or
leaves the DDMZ, the group key (Kg) is updated by the CA
node. The fact that, the RA nodes are confident, for security
reason, updating the group key of the DDMZ ensures the
privacy of the DDMZ secret. Hence the DDMZ pair keys
private or public change when the DDMZ group key changes.
However, even if the attacker has obtained this group key, it is
unable to know the session keys or to compromise the cluster.
DoS attacks: Usually the attacker needs to eavesdrop the
communication in order to detect the nodes’ activities and
plan its attack against them. However, with ICCP protocol
the attacker cannot determine who ensures the CA or RA
activities. If the attacker node wants to plan an attack against
the CA node or the RA node, as first step it needs to identify
them. Even if the attacker uses the traffic analysis attacks in
order to identify the RA or CA nodes, it can just know if it
is located in the vicinity of the DDMZ but it can in no way
identify the RA nodes or the CA node, because the RA nodes
use the pseudonym DDMZ to communicate as RA nodes and
its pseudo identity to communicate normally. However, it is
possible to attack RA nodes by selecting randomly nodes
at the attacker’s neighbourhood, but the risk to detect the
attacker is high. Let’s suppose that the attacker successes in
compromising one confident node Nc, the attacker can obtain
the secret point SPc of Nc node and also its real identity
IDc. However, the attacker cannot compromise the entire trust
model and unmask the confident nodes, because with this
information the attacker can just check if any node belongs
to the set of confident nodes or not.
B. Performance analysis
TABLE II
TABLE OF DEFINITION AND NOTATION FOR PERFORMANCE ESTIMATION
TP Time for the pairing function computation
TX Time for the modular exponentiation in G1
TM Time for the modular multiplication in G1
TH Time for the hashing computation
TE Time for asymmetric encryption operation
TD Time for asymmetric decryption operation
TS Time for symmetric encryption and decryption operation
In order to analyse the performance of ICCP protocol in
term of time complexity (TC) in different phases, we define
the set of notations illustrated in table II.
The identity change phase: the time complexity of the iden-
tity change for each Nx is estimated as follows: TC(Nx) =
TH+2.TM which is acceptable for each cluster’s configuration
or formation.
Anonymous confident authentication phase: the time com-
plexity of the anonymous authentication between two confi-
dent nodes Nx and Ny is estimated as follows:{
TC(Nx) = TE + TX + TP + 2.(TH + TS)
TC(Ny) = TD + TX + TP + 2.(TH + TS)
This phase is executed before the cluster’s formation and in
the first communication between two clusters.
The anonymity establishment in the cluster: the time com-
plexity to establish the anonymity in the cluster is estimated
for the CA and RA nodes as follows:{
TC(CA) = 2.TM + (3 + k).TH + (2 + k).TX + k.TS + TE
TC(RA) = k.TD + 2.(TX + TH) + TS
where k is the number of RA nodes in the cluster.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate on the existing anonymity pro-
tocols, and we proposed the identity Change and Camouflage
Protocols (ICCP) based on some military defence mechanisms.
The proposed protocol named ICCP is based on the clus-
tering approach particularly our hierarchical architecture [5].
We design a mechanism that allows any confident node to
anonymously authenticate other confident nodes. Furthermore,
we illustrate, how we can establish an anonymous DDMZ
(Dynamic Demilitarized Zone). In addition, two kinds of the
intra-cluster communication is presented: intra-ADDMZ and
Extra-ADDMZ. Furthermore, the inter-cluster communication
is investigated and the protocol to CA nodes authentication
is presented. The ICCP is designed to resist against different
attacks such as: DoS or capture attacks. In order to evaluate the
ICCP, the time complexity and security analysis are presented.
The ICCP can be extended to secure the routing protocol. As
future work, we plan to implement and simulate the ICCP in
heterogeneous nodes.
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